Background
Proceedings, issued in 2020 against three (initially four) local authorities: Hertfordshire, Essex and Hackney, as well as the Metropolitan Police, raised contentious questions about the scope of state responsibility for protecting vulnerable children from sexual and criminal exploitation. The claim engaged the limits of common law liability, operational duties under Articles 3 and 4 ECHR, and the dangers of litigating historic child protection decisions through the lens of hindsight.
At its core lay a challenge to the professional judgment of social workers and a focused legal question of real significance for public authority defendants: having accepted responsibility by accommodating the claimant under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, did the scope of the common law duty of care extend to an obligation to seek a care order under section 31 and/or secure accommodation under section 25 Children Act 1989?
Conducted on behalf of the London Borough of Hackney by Kate Prestidge, Partner, and Jo Hallmark, Legal Director, of DAC Beachcroft, with Adam Weitzman KC and Christina Lyons of 7 Bedford Row as counsel, the claim finally reached trial at the Royal Courts of Justice in March 2026. It ended abruptly when the legally aided claimant discontinued her claim against all four defendants following critical concessions by her independent social work expert during the final week of a four week trial.
The case exemplifies the growing risk of “duty creep” claims against public authorities and the importance, for insurers, of testing those arguments rigorously on the evidence rather than resolving them prematurely.
Evidential lessons from the trial
Discontinuance at trial: hindsight risk and evidential failure
The discontinuance of the claimant’s case illustrates the inherent risks of litigating complex child protection decision making through the lens of hindsight.
The evidential picture that emerged at trial was strikingly adverse to the pleaded case and provides a clear indication of how such arguments are likely to fare when scrutinised, offering reassurance for defendants and their insurers.
The withdrawal of the claim after three weeks of lay and expert evidence meant there was no judicial determination on the scope of the defendants' duty of care, but it followed a fundamental collapse of the claimant’s expert case rather than any procedural or tactical resolution.
Mr Justice Bourne expressly recorded in the recital to the final order that there was an insufficient evidential basis for the negligence allegations against the named social workers: an observation of real significance notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.
Secure accommodation: exceptional, not protective by default
A central allegation in this claim was that Hackney should have sought secure accommodation under section 25 CA 1989. That allegation fell away once the claimant’s own social care expert accepted in cross examination that secure accommodation is an exceptional, liberty-restricting measure of last resort, often regarded as counterproductive and capable of exacerbating long-term harm.
This evidence went directly to the claimant’s attempt to recast statutory discretion as legal obligation. For defendants, it reinforces that a decision not to pursue secure accommodation may properly reflect a proportionate and professionally defensible exercise of judgment, rather than negligent practice.
No added practical benefit of care orders for 16+ young people
The claimant’s assertion that a section 31 care order would have materially altered her trajectory similarly failed. Her care expert accepted that, for a 16+ young person accommodated under section 20, a care order offers no additional practical safeguarding benefit given the centrality of consent.
This reinforced the orthodox position, as argued in DFX v Coventry CC [2021] EWHC 13282 QB, that statutory powers do not equate to common law duties, particularly where court ordered intervention would override an older child’s autonomy, again underscoring why the scope of a duty of care issue justified being tested at trial.
Professional judgment within the permissible range
The lay witness evidence demonstrated sustained and escalating protective action was taken by Hackney’s social workers: multi agency safeguarding in line with PAN London guidelines, frequent contact, and careful placement management. Crucially, the claimant’s care expert accepted in cross-examination that supporting the claimant in semi-independent accommodation with increasing supervision, rather than seeking secure accommodation, fell squarely within reasonable professional practice, consistent with Hayden J's guidance in London Borough of Barking and Dagenham v SS [2014] EWHC 4436 (Fam).
Expert evidence and litigation discipline
This case underscores the decisive role of expert evidence. The claimant’s case unravelled once it was clear key opinions from her care expert could not withstand cross examination. The defendants' expert had always maintained that Hackney had exceeded the standard of social care practice, a position borne out by the claimant's discontinuance and the recital of Bourne J.
The partial disapplication of QOCS under CPR 44.16 serves as a reminder that claims of this nature must be evidentially robust before being taken to trial, given their cost and impact on public services and individual professionals.
Read on for the detail of the claim, the defence strategy, and how these issues were tested at trial.
Details of the case and the defence strategy
Overview of the claimant’s case against Hackney
Following several iterations of the Particulars of Claim, the claimant settled on allegations that Hackney failed to protect her from serious harm during two defined periods: August 2011, and January to August 2012.
In August 2011, she advanced breaches of Articles 3 and 4 ECHR and contended that Hackney knew or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk of sexual exploitation and abuse by an older male, yet failed to assess or intervene adequately, resulting in sexual and physical abuse culminating in a serious assault shortly before her 16th birthday.
Between January and August 2012, while aged 16 and accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, she alleged ongoing sexual and criminal exploitation by gang members and contended that, despite awareness of that risk and being prompted by the police to consider secure accommodation, Hackney negligently failed to seek a care order under section 31 and/or secure accommodation under section 25.
Negligence: duty accepted, expansion resisted
Hackney accepted that section 20 accommodation involved an assumption of responsibility giving rise to a duty of care. The dispute concerned its limits. Hackney argued the duty was real but confined: to safe accommodation and risks closely connected with it, not to protection from all community based harm nor to invoking court ordered measures.
Relying on Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, N v Poole BC [2020] AC 780, and HXA/YXA v Surrey CC [2023] UKSC 52, Hackney emphasised that public authorities are not generally liable for harm caused by third parties or for failing to exercise statutory powers, absent a recognised assumption of responsibility. The decisive question was therefore not whether Hackney had powers under sections 31 or 25, but whether, by accommodating the claimant under section 20, it had assumed a duty to exercise them.
Supreme Court authority, Hackney submitted, dictated that it had not.
Central to the analysis was the qualitative distinction between voluntary accommodation and court-ordered state intervention. Section 20 accommodation is consensual, and in this case consent was provided by the claimant at age 16. By contrast, care and secure accommodation orders require judicial authorisation and involve significant interferences with liberty and family life. Hackney argued that it would be legally incoherent for a duty arising from consensual accommodation to require the pursuit of statutory orders whose very purpose is to override that consent.
This key dispute, of wide importance beyond the case itself, was a central reason why the claim was properly taken to trial.
Human Rights Act: operational thresholds, not a substitute for negligence
Hackney resisted the claimant's attempt to use Articles 3 and 4 as substitutes for negligence. While accepting that serious assaults could meet the Article 3 threshold, Hackney emphasised the need for a real and immediate risk and a failure to take reasonable measures, assessed without hindsight. As to Article 4, the pleaded facts did not engage slavery or servitude and, in any event, Article 4 is subject to the same demanding operational duty test.
Hackney’s closing submissions following discontinuance
Following discontinuance, Mr Adam Weitzman KC submitted to Bourne J that the claim had been misconceived from the outset and unravelled once the evidence, particularly the claimant’s expert evidence, was tested.
Mr Weitzman KC also drew attention to the significant financial and professional cost to public authorities and the burden placed on individual social workers facing serious public allegations later shown to lack evidential foundation.
Addressing the substance of the claim, Mr Weitzman KC concluded that the evidence made it “plain as a pikestaff” that Hackney's decision‑making (which included supporting the claimant in the community with incrementally increased supervision across successive semi-independent placements, rather than seeking secure accommodation) fell squarely within reasonable professional practice. In substance, both Hackney and their social workers were exonerated.
Defendant takeaway
While the absence of a final judgment leaves some legal questions unresolved, the evidential outcome strongly reinforces core defensive principles:
- Secure accommodation is a true measure of last resort.
- Care orders do not automatically enhance protection for 16+ young people.
- Child protection decisions attract a wide margin of professional discretion.
- Attempts to expand the scope of duty beyond established authority face substantial evidential resistance.
For defendants and insurers alike, the case demonstrates that principled resistance to duty expansion, supported by robust expert evidence, remains both viable and justified.
For further discussion of the issues arising from this case, or advice on defending similar claims, please contact Kate Prestidge, Partner, or Jo Hallmark, Legal Director in our Specialist Liability Team.
