In this case, the High Court provided guidance on handling conduct concerns against doctors in recognised training grades. The judge refused to continue an injunction that had initially stopped an NHS Foundation Trust from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing concerning allegations of sexual harassment against a specialist trainee doctor. The court reiterated that, save for serious and irremediable contractual breaches, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to run their course without judicial “micro‑management”.
Facts
The claimant, Dr Nirmal, was an ST5 trainee doctor employed by Birmingham Women's and Children's Hospital NHS Foundation Trust ("the Trust"). Two colleagues made complaints against Dr Nirmal, alleging repeated inappropriate and sexualised behaviour during and around work. Earlier concerns had been dealt with informally, but further allegations led to a formal investigation and a recommendation that the matter proceed to a misconduct hearing under the Trust’s MHPS policy.
The Trust consulted Health Education England (now part of NHS England), which advised that the allegations were conduct matters and that the Trust should investigate them, keeping the Dean informed. The Trust therefore chose its internal disciplinary route rather than a training‑only process.
The claimant argued that this decision breached his contract by mis‑categorising the allegations as conduct rather than training issues. He also complained about procedural unfairness, including short notice of the hearing, the Trust’s stated position that he could not have legal representation, and an apparent intention not to call complainant witnesses to give live evidence.
Dr Nirmal sought an injunction at the High Court to prevent the Trust from holding a disciplinary hearing. He argued that the Trust was required to treat the allegations as a “training issue” having regard to the MHPS framework which provides (in Part III) that: “Any allegation of misconduct against a doctor or dentist in recognised training grades should be considered initially as a training issue and dealt with via the educational supervisor and college or clinical tutor with close involvement of the postgraduate dean from the outset.”
An injunction was granted shortly before the scheduled disciplinary hearing, preventing it from taking place. In the most recent hearing, the Court had to consider whether the injunction should continue.
Decision
The High Court discharged the injunction. The court’s key conclusions were as follows:
Choice of disciplinary / training route. The judge reaffirmed that it is for the employer to decide which disciplinary route to follow, subject to contractual compliance. Some categories of alleged misconduct, including serious or repeated sexual harassment, may reasonably fall outside a training‑only route:
" …I agree with the Defendant that some types of gross misconduct allegations are likely to be inappropriate for the training route. They are more likely to be considered in the disciplinary route. This is so for many reasons. One reason appears to me to be that medical training and supervision is likely to be more focussed on how to train the Claimant to be a good doctor, knowledgeable, capable and skilful, interacting well with patients and colleagues, and less about how to behave properly more widely (for instance not providing training about not committing crimes or how to drive carefully)".
Requirements of MHPS. In Part III of MHPS, paragraph 6, there is no mandatory requirement for Trusts to deal with conduct concerns against doctors in training as a training issue. Although MHPS says that an employer "should initially" treat conduct concerns as a training issue it does not say "must".
Calling and cross‑examining witnesses. The court rejected the suggestion that there is a general right in disciplinary proceedings to require complainants to attend for cross‑examination. Decisions about witnesses are management decisions to be judged by standards of fairness and reasonableness, not by analogy with court proceedings. Whether live evidence is required depends on the facts of the case, and panels must be able to justify their approach if challenged later.
Overall, the court concluded that continuing the injunction would amount to impermissible micro‑management of an employer’s disciplinary process and that the panel was capable of “ironing out” the identified problems itself.
What does this mean for employers?
This is an important case for NHS employers, particularly those managing conduct concerns of a sexual nature involving doctors in training. It provides clarity and guidance on the scope of the requirements under the MHPS Framework.
Employers retain discretion to choose whether allegations involving trainees are dealt with as misconduct or through training processes, provided relevant national guidance is considered and contractual terms are not breached – and provided the process followed is fair and reasonable. National policies such as MHPS are influential and may be contractually incorporated, but they do not act as a ban on disciplinary action. Wording such as “should initially” allows room for judgement, particularly where allegations are serious or repeated.
The High Court also pointed out that disciplinary policies that purport to exclude legal representation for doctors are unlawful and should be reviewed to ensure they are compliant with case law.
Case: Nirmal v Birmingham Women's and Children's Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 723
