In March 2026, the High Court considered two cases where the Defendants were represented by DAC Beachcroft via instruction from NHS Resolution. Charlotte Jones was instructed on both cases. Both the Newcastle upon Tyne and Manchester District Registries considered what constituted an 'accident' following Paul v. Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024]. These cases are the first claims determined/reported following the decision in Paul.
The circumstances giving rise to two cases being discussed in this article are tragic for those involved. The content of this article is not to detract from the events or minimise the seriousness of the injuries being discussed and the consequences for the families involved. It should also be noted that this article contains content that some readers may find distressing or sensitive.
MIM v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 562 (KB)
The Claimant sought damages, as a secondary victim, for a psychiatric injury which he attributed to witnessing the negligent management of his wife's labour and subsequent delivery of his son. Following an Early Notification Scheme ("ENS") investigation it was admitted there were negligent failures in respect of MIM's son's delivery, and that with earlier delivery MIM's son would have avoided injury. The events relied on by the Claimant as constituting an "accident" included, amongst other things, hearing an alarm beeping and being switched off by midwives without explanation, being told an episiotomy was needed and seeing his wife scared, feeling worried about what was happening and perceiving the last 30 minutes of labour as "panic stations". It was also argued, in the alternative, that it was not only an "accident" that could give rise to a secondary victim claim. The Defendant's case was that the events fell short of meeting the definition of an "accident" as defined in Paul.
DAC Beachcroft on behalf of the Defendant applied to strike out the claim, or alternatively for summary judgment. The application was heard before HHJ Evans on 5 March 2026. The claim was struck out and the Defendant was awarded its costs (QOCS having been disapplied). HHJ Evans did not accept the Claimant's submission that Paul allowed for secondary victim claims that were not "accidents" -
"Reading the Judgment as a whole it is clear that in order to succeed a secondary victim must have witnessed an accident which caused (or had the capacity to cause) injury to the primary victim". [para 21]
As to whether the events amounted to an "accident" HHJ Evans considered the submissions made amounted to a medical crisis and not an "accident". She referred to the Paul Judgment where it is said that an accident is "a discrete event… something which happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a particular way" [para 30]. In other words, it is something that can be pinpointed.
BJS (by his Mother and Litigation Friend SXS) and SXS v Cumbria Northumberland Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust and North Cumbria Integrated Health NHS Foundation Trust [2025]
The Trial in respect of the secondary victim claim was heard by HHJ Freedman at Newcastle District Registry on 3 March 2026.
The First Claimant became acutely unwell on 7 September 2020 and arrangements were made by the First Defendant for an admission to a paediatric ward at the Second Defendant's hospital overnight pending a full assessment the next day. After admission, he became increasingly agitated, attempted to leave the ward, and forced his way through secured doors onto a first-floor staff walkway. He climbed over a frosted glass partition using a handrail and fell several metres, sustaining life‑threatening injuries. The Second Claimant witnessed her son climb over the partition and fall, and saw him injured on the ground beneath.
It was the Second Claimant's case that what occurred was an "accident". The Defendants' case was that First Claimant's actions and consequences, however traumatic and devastating for the Second Claimant to witness, were not an "accident" within the definition set in Paul. His actions were the manifestation of his mental health mental crisis, i.e. 'medical crises'. It was not an unexpected or unintended event. Further the relevant proximity to establish a duty of care to the Second Claimant was absent.
HHJ Freedman handed his ex tempore judgment down on 3 March 2026. He noted that the Supreme Court defined an "accident" as an "unexpected, unintended event which caused injury to the victim by violent external means". He was not allowed to depart from that [para 37]. What occurred was nowhere close to meeting the Supreme Court's definition of an "accident" [para 39 and 42]. It was not analogous to one and that would not be sufficient either [para 39]. As there was no "accident" it followed that no duty of care was owed by the Defendants to the Second Claimant [para 43].
Conclusion
It is now two years since the Supreme Court decision in Paul and these two DAC Beachcroft LLP cases are the first where the Courts have assessed the "accident" definition in two very tragic but different scenarios. Whilst each case will be fact specific, Defendants can perhaps be reassured by the judicial comments made in these cases and the application of the decision reached in Paul. The award of damages as a secondary victim will remain an exceptional category of clinical negligence case.
